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Contribution to the 3rd block: One of the newest phenomena arising on a global level as a result of the worldwide food crisis, which is causing havoc in the economy in various poor countries, such as Bolivia,  is the process of the purchase of enormous tracts of agricultural lands in poor, undeveloped countries in Africa and Latin America, by buyers in rich or emerging developed nations.

In fact, the subject is being studied in various specialized centers, and among the first conclusions drawn is that the governments of wealthy and emerging nations that experience food shortages, with large populations and little land, are losing confidence in the market as the main supplier of food for their people. Currently, these nations, their governments, and transnational companies purchase, or lease, lands for long periods of time, mostly in African countries that have these lands, to produce food, which they then ship to their own countries. The great paradox is that these countries in which these lands are sold are the poorest and hungriest in the world, especially some African nations that have abundant land and natural resources, but lack the economic conditions to render these resources productive for their own people. These countries are, at the same time, recipients of immense quantities of food donated by international organizations working to alleviate hunger and chronic malnutrition.

In Latin America, studies confirm that the concentration and foreign assumption of lands is largely related or dependent upon the sustained demand for worldwide consumption of soy and other oil producing crops, and their derivatives. This interest causes a rapid growth in these crops, with increasing involvement of foreign capital. Our neighbors and brothers, Brazil and Argentina, together cultivate around 45 million hectares, making them the largest soy producers in the world. It is the big transnational corporations, global “agribusiness” companies, which control the land market in these countries and monopolize large tracts of millions of acres that are intended not to produce food for those countries, but to answer the global demand (called commodities) for oils that are used, first, to feed livestock overseas, to produce biofuels, second, and only in third place for human consumption of oil and meal. This has caused the parliaments in these countries, and upon express request from their presidents (Lula in Brazil, Mujica in Uruguay late in 2010, and Kirshner in Argentina at the beginning of 2011) to prepare specific legislation to restrict the currently uncontrolled process of foreign purchase of land, since it brings serious problems with sovereignty, food insecurity, and concentration of economic and political power into the hands of these foreign land owners.

On the other hand, in the three small countries of Mercosur (extended), Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, the process of foreign purchase of lands has developed a more regional character that could be called “latinoamericanization of land ownership“, since the amount of land in these countries owned or leased by Brazilians and Argentines (in that order) is ever increasing. This means that the business capacity of Brazilians and Argentines, and the soy producing companies in those countries, can expand into neighboring countries (Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia) without any control, since the law in each of these countries is very lax in relation to foreign purchase and ownership of lands. More specifically, in Paraguay, of a total of 3 million hectares of soy beans cultivated annually, 60% would be the property of Brazilian farmers, called “Brasiguayos”. In Uruguay, nearly the entirety of half a million hectares now dedicated to the cultivation of soy are leased by Argentine producers from former Uruguayan farmers. However, unlike Paraguay and Bolivia, where the States do not have either the institutional capacity nor the political will to register lands owned by foreigners, in Uruguay these is a notable system for registration of transactions that enables precise knowledge of which lands are belong to Uruguayans, which are sold, if the new owners are foreign or domestic, what the lands are used for, and, even, the price per hectare paid in the transactions. In Bolivia, in exchange, despited nearly 15 years of Agrarian Reform and land reclamation, we are light-years from being able to institute a public information system with such features.

In our country, nearly a million hectares of land are dedicated to the production of soy crops annually.  Of these, more than half are cultivated by Brazilians, Mennonites, and other foreigners. They are the best lands, the most productive and most appropriate for grain and vegetable oil production in the country. What must be discussed now is, how can these Bolivian lands be reclaimed for use to produce, especially, wheat, a product which Bolivia chronically lacks, as well as corn, rice, and other food products, both to meet national demand, as well as for export.  The problem is that the growing international price of soy and the ever increasing use of GM seeds render the cultivation of soy increasingly attractive to producers, who choose soy over production of other food products, indispensable to feeding Bolivian families.  The producers’ argument old-hat: the Bolivian market is small, and is not attractive to investors. This is why the regulations for soy exports proposed by the Government last year was resisted so vehemently among exporters, who now blame the government for the current rising food prices and shortages, and argument that is only partially correct.

Miguel Urioste is senior investigator and former Fundación TIERRA executive director. He will not participate at the conference “Move! United for sustainable development on occasion” of Welthungerhilfe`s 50th anniversary. Instead of him Juan Pablo Chumacero investigator of Fundación TIERRA will be at the conference.

Contribution to the 1st block: In Burkina Faso, West Africa, inhabited by 16 million people, 80% of this population lives of agricultural production. The farms are poorly-equipped family farms that barely exceed 3 to 4 ha on average per family. Each family includes an average of 10 members. Fewer than 30% of these farms use selected seeds and fertilizer. Agricultural production is directly dependent on rainfall, which has become unreliable, ranging from floods (2007, 2009) to droughts (2011). Moreover, the country has acquired a sort of culture of hunger due to the successive famines that have punctuated its history: We can cite the famines of 1850, 1907, 1949, 1973 and 1985, as well as the endless food shortages that occur almost every other year like the one in 2011, which is a famine that is unacknowledged as such in certain areas of the country.

In fact, the government has identified 160 rural municipalities out of 300 where production is insufficient and where the food crisis poses a problem. The common factors of these famines are, for the past century, the periodic invasions of desert locust and for this century, the lack of rain. This is the context in which the NGO SOS Sahel International Burkina Faso (which I have the honor to chair) intervenes on-site with assistance and support that is meant to make the farmer organizations aware of their responsibilities and give them autonomy. This intervention essentially consists in searching for techniques for adapting to climate change and popularizing them.

Climate changes have a direct negative influence on agricultural production and on the life of rural populations. In 2007, for example, exceptional rainfall in August destroyed the rice and sorghum crops in the western part of Burkina, carrying away entire food supplies. Overnight, producers found themselves in brutal poverty, transforming them into vulnerable people living a precarious existence. My organization, with the financial support of the European Union, has provided assistance to the entire western part of the Country by rehabilitating destroyed rice paddies and roads that have become impassible thus isolating villages from others. The rehabilitation actions had two objectives: through “cash- for-work” to get producers working in their own rice paddies to rebuild the destroyed diguettes and to have ready cash to meet everyday requirements. For the rehabilitation of roads, to offer the populations, women included, the possibility of high labor intensive work (HIMO) and to receive money to deal with the brutal poverty caused by the destruction of their goods.

In 2011, rain was rare throughout the country. This is the main direct cause of the poor harvests in thousands of villages. In the village of Tikaré, for example (Le Bam Province), in the Baloum district, producer “B” saw his crop harvests reduced to less than 50%. In an ordinary year without calamities, he gathered six cartloads of sorghum (or some twenty 100kg sacks of sorghum, so around 2 tons). This year, his harvest was 1 ton. His difficulties did not stop there. Instead of gathering 20 “20-liter drums of cowpeas” or 20 times 12 kg (240 kg), he only harvested 4 “drums” or 48 kg of cowpeas. Now, cowpea is a protein-rich food supplement that is popular in the villages. And that’s not all. For his goat farming activities, he did not have enough hay to store, because there was not enough rain; as a result, the peanut haulm (dried out before maturity, so no peanut harvest) and cowpea haulm were not abundant and therefore could not be gathered. His neighbor, who usually grows cotton, was unable to meet his obligations: the loans for the necessary NPK fertilizer (complete fertilizer necessary for cotton production) as well as the pesticides that are indispensable for treating parasites purchased on credit in June could not be repaid in December, since the cotton production was mediocre. Instead of harvesting a ton, he only brought in 150 kg. The unpaid loan was deferred to the upcoming 2012 crop year, so he now has two loans! Producers have thus gone from living a life that was already lacking in abundance to a life of restrictions.The food situation is already difficult in certain villages. In all, the Government would need to mobilize the 154,000 missing tons from the 2011 crop year. Close to 6 million people need to be helped. The estimated costs is 103 billion CFA francs.

Faced with this new situation created by climate change, our organization joined in one of the undertakings of the Government of Burkina: encouraging the use of improved seeds, encouraging the use of organic fertilizer, subscribing to the intensification of rice production in the lowland areas combined with the use of subsidized chemical fertilizers. This policy has already produced positive effects with a doubling of lowland rice production in 3 years; and on or around the year 2016, the country’s production will attain and surpass national rice consumption, i.e., 400,000 tons. In the same manner, the Government emphasized the production of cowpeas both for family consumption and for export to neighboring countries. Our organization supports this industry in the programs that we are developing. Similarly, our organization supports the governmental policy of off season production: producing vegetables and corn during the dry season wherever water supply points exist, resulting in our commitment to build retaining reservoirs and “boulis” (small watering holes). These dry season crops make up for the lost earnings due to the lack of rain from May to October.

On the other hand, we are opposed to the Government’s “agrobusiness” strategy. This means that all those who have money can buy large tracts of land from rural farmers to produce an enterprise of their choosing. (For the time being, it is nouveaux riches nationals who are helping themselves to the land).  In this way, the land will soon be in the hands of the rich, and the sons of rural farmers will be “landless” with a breakdown of the national society and the inevitable tensions. We counter that with the need to bet on family farms to modernize agriculture not in the sense of over-mechanization, but out of a concern for adapting to the changes in these family farms. Here, the dialog between the two parties is merely a dialogue of the deaf, since the Government feels that agrobusiness is the prosperous way out for the nation’s agriculture, while we feel that this option is an erroneous strategy with disastrous consequences for the country in the medium-term.

Alfred Sawadogo is Chairman of the BD of SOS Sahel International Burkina Faso.

There is a mad rush for land in Sierra Leone all for the purpose of large scale agricultural business. How the land is acquired from communities and how negotiations occur between parties in the sector is very selective, opaque, unorganized and not well monitored. There is claim and counter claim that land is available for large scale agricultural business.

In this context I ask the simple question: is land grabbing really taking place in Sierra Leone? The answer from me is yes this observable fact is taking place! Often when land of 1000 hectares and more is acquired from unsuspecting persons in dubious and shady methods, this act is referred to as land grabbing. In Sierra Leone today there are foreign companies that have acquired through lease holds (50yrs and over) large swaths of land in the range of thousands of hectares from poor peasants in collusion with agents of the states and other private money hunters. The quantum or area of land that we are talking about is colossal: it has reached stands at 19% of the total arable land in Sierra Leone. In real terms we are talking of figures in the range of about one million hectares.

The arable land in this country supports 75% of the population (accounting for some 730,000 farming households) for their livelihoods through farming. These farmers are contributing to about 50% of the gross domestic product of the country. The farmers by and large practice shifting cultivation that requires a farmer to farm his 2-3 acres of land for 2-3 years and move on to another plot. The land he/she leaves is left to rejuvenate naturally for a number of years before it is farmed again. In the past research has shown that this fallow period would take 15 – 20 years. In two separate methodologies investigating current fallow trends, the figure derived does not exceed 6 years for the national. In some district this figure is much lower or higher.

But what happens to the fallow period if a million hectares is subtracted from the present arable land area of the country? Surely the fallow will further shrink and areas from which large scale land is leased will be most affected. At the national level its impact will manifest through the insecurity of food. How would this happen? The lesser the fallow period the lesser it takes the land to gain fertility and stability for sustaining crop production, hence lowering yield levels. Furthermore, the impact of the elements on the land when biodiversity is lesser and cannot perform the required ecosystem service would only lead to land degradation and the effect of land degradation in agriculture is serious crop failure and an insecure food regime for the country.

Let us also consider population growth against land availability and food security. Using the conservative population growth rate of 2.25 we have calculated and projected that in 36 years starting from 2011, our population is likely to double reaching an estimated 12 million people. 75% of this population will be in rural communities and they will be depending on the land for farming and likely in much the same way producing food for the country, even where they will also be self employed. Given the situation where as calculated 19% of the country’s arable land is taken for 50 years means that population doubling time will take place within the lease years and huge portion of Sierra Leone’s territory will be in the possession of foreign direct investors. A population trying to fend off the land that is less productive cannot feed a nation that will also be hungry and lacks security of food. A nation with food deficit is going to be dependent on external food sources. Considering the recent international food price spikes which is still being projected to continue in the future is bound to have great toll of hardship on a hard press nation and its people.

Dwelling a little on process of land acquisition, it is pretty painful to see how the processes are subjected to abuse. The Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) has a fine even if less sufficient process for investors to use as guide to acquire large scale land for agri-investment. Cardinal in the process are consultation with communities; free, prior and informed consent; involvement of all including the land owners in the land agreement; and observing the equator principles. SLIEPA guidelines further states that the nucleus farm estate should not include community farm land, sacred groves, high biodiversity spots and burial grounds.

Our research findings have shown that the SLIEPA guidelines are ignored not only by the investors but also by the agencies of the state involved in the process. While some communities would say that consultations were lopsided and not informative enough to make an informed consent, others would tell you that information doled out were in piece meal and full of misleads. Some communities were even coerced and threatened to accept the deal. As for signing the agreement only chiefdom elders in most cases signed the lease agreement, legitimate land owners were ignored. Even the freedom to say no was not respected.

The equator principle largely has to do with undertaking an environmental social and health impact assessment (ESHIA).The production of an environmental assessment is in line with the Environmental law. What we have been observing in the field is that investors are normally far advanced in their field operations as their ESHIA make way to the Environmental Protection Agency Sierra Leone (EPASL). The EPA law is ignored and we are yet to see the measure taken by EPASL by defaulting investors. Some large scale land lease agreements stumbled on are so bland, one would question the competencies of the solicitors who constructed them. A large scale land lease is virtually a replica of a normal one-town lot lease agreement. The communities are not assisted with solicitors that would support them in their negotiation of what should be in the agreement.

Added to this problem is the fact that by ignoring the SLIEPA guidelines, the government through the Ministry of Agriculture also leases land from communities and sublease the same to the investors. This is perfect case of conflict of interest, since the interest of government and that of the investor will be the same. In the event where there exist discord between the company and the land owners would only mean that government’s interest will be affected as well.

Joseph Rahall, Director, Green Scenery (Sierra Leone)

Thousands of Cambodian families have lost their land to the rich and powerful in recent years. In Phnom Penh and the 12 provinces in which LICADHO works – roughly half the country – over 400,000 people have been affected by land-grabbing and evictions since 2003. In 2011 alone, over 11,000 families were newly affected by land conflicts. The international community has previously called for a moratorium on evictions, yet the pace of forced displacements has not decreased. As a result, the potential for unrest and violence as a result of land grabbing has been steadily increasing.
One major contributor to this increase in land conflicts is the growing issuance of Economic Land Concessions (ELCs), which now represent over 50% of all arable land in Cambodia. An ELC is a long term lease, usually 99 years, of state private property that the government grants to a private entity. ELCs are intended to promote industrial agriculture development. As of February 2012, LICADHO has documented that the government has given at least 2,033,664 hectares of land to private companies in long-term leases.
In granting these highly lucrative long-term leases, often for just a few dollars per hectare per year, Cambodian authorities routinely ignore and violate Cambodia’s 2001 Land Law and other laws and regulations with protective provisions. Some of the ignored laws were even drafted with the technical support of EU countries.
The Land Law, for example, limits ELCs to 10,000 hectares each. It also provides for land ownership rights based on good faith possession or inhabitation. A 2005 sub-decree on ELCs offers further legal protections for residents facing such concessions over their land. Under the sub-decree, an ELC may only be granted after there have been public consultations about the project or proposal with territorial authorities and residents of the locality. Solutions must also be reached for any potential resettlement issues before an ELC may be legally granted, and there must be Environmental and Social Impact Assessments. Yet prior consultations with local residents have rarely, if ever, taken place.
The expansion of the sugar industry, largely incentivized by the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, is fast becoming one of the leading causes of land-grabbing in Cambodia. The government has granted concessions totaling more than 80,000 hectares for sugar cane cultivation over the last two years. Over 60,000 of those hectares have been granted to companies controlled or partially owned by powerful ruling party Senator Ly Yong Phat. The Senator has also managed to contravene the Land Law’s limitation on concession size through a series of creative moves, such as the formation of shell companies which receive adjacent blocks of land.

Another significant portion of the increase in ELCs is attributable to concessions over protected land, such as wildlife sanctuaries and nature preserves. Often the land has been hastily reclassified as state private property to allow for the grant, because the Land Law requires that ELCs be granted over state private land only.
Many of the protected areas have been developed with substantial help from international development partners, including the EU and World Bank. That assistance is at serious risk of being lost as the government continues to implement its unsustainable reclassification strategy.
Another disturbing and dangerous aspect of Cambodia’s land-grabbing crisis is the involvement of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) personnel, particularly in rural areas. Soldiers often are hired as security guards for concessions, participate in evictions of families from their homes or agricultural land on the orders of the government, or even grab land for their own benefit. Where soldiers participate in forced evictions, it is typically on behalf of private interests with close links to the ruling party. This is unlawful. Unlike the police and gendarmerie, soldiers have no law enforcement or eviction powers. At least six incidents involving armed military and polices forces opening fire during land protests have occurred in the past three months. A total of 19 residents were injured at the protests, including seven from gunfire. Each of the incidents has been documented in video footage or photographs, but arrests have been in made in relation to only one incident.
Land-grabbing carries a huge social and economic cost – taking away families’ homes or ricefields makes them poorer, reduces their ability to access education, health care, and other services, and makes them more vulnerable to exploitation such as human trafficking. Thus, it directly undercuts the objectives of the EU and other development partners who give millions of dollars in aid to the Cambodian government to support programs to reduce poverty, improve healthcare and education, protect women and children, and achieve other humanitarian aims. Moreover, land-grabbing can actually cut off all access to tangible benefits secured through development aid – such as wells, non-timber forest products, or irrigation infrastructure.

Dr. Pung Chhiv Kek is President and Founder of the Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO)